Ten thousand security pitfalls:
The ZIP file format.

Gynvael Coldwind
@ Technische Hochschule Ingolstadt, 2018

About your presenter

(among other things)

All opinions expressed during this presentation are mine and mine alone, and not those of my barber, my accountant or my employer.

What's on the menu

Also featuring: **Steganography**

1. What's ZIP used for again?
2. What can be stored in a ZIP?
   a. Also, file names
3. ZIP format 101 and format repair
4. Legacy ZIP encryption
5. ZIP format and multiple personalities
6. ZIP encryption and CRC32
7. Miscellaneous, i.e. all the things not mentioned so far.

Or actually, hacking a "secure cloud disk" website.

EDITORIAL NOTE

Everything in this color is a quote from the official ZIP specification by PKWARE Inc.

The specification is commonly known as **APPNOTE.TXT**

https://pkware.cachefly.net/webdocs/casestudies/APPNOTE.TXT

Cyber Secure CloudDisk


Where is ZIP used?

.zip files, obviously

Default ZIP file icon from
Microsoft Windows 10's Explorer

And also...

.odt, .odp, .ods, ...
(**OpenDocument**)

Open Packaging Conventions:
.3mf, .dwfx, .cddx, .familyx,
.fdix, .appv, .semblio, .vsix,
.vsdx, .appx, .appxbundle, .cspkg,
.xps, .nupkg, .oxps, .jtx, .slx, .smpk,
.scdoc,
and **Offixe Open XML formats**:
.docx, .pptx, .xlsx

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Packaging_Conventions

And also...



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JAR_(file_format)

And also...

.apk
(Android Application Package)

Icon from Android SDK

.epub
(Electronic Publication)



calibre

And also... (script to scan drives)

```
import os
import sys

IGNORE_LIST = {
   ".zip", ".docx", ".odt", ".epub", ".jar", ".xlsx",
".pyz",
   ".pptx", ".odp",
}

def process_file(fname):
  try:
    with open(fname, "rb") as f:
      d = f.read(4)
  except WindowsError:
    return False  # No access probably, don't care.
  except IOError:
    return False  # No access probably, don't care.
  if d.startswith("PK\3\4"):
    return True
  return False


def scan_dir(path):
  try:
    entries = os.listdir(path)
  except WindowsError:
    return  # No access probably, don't care.
  for fname in entries:
    name, ext = os.path.splitext(fname)
    if ext.lower() in IGNORE_LIST:
      continue

    if ext == '':
      ext = '_'

    full_path = path + "\\" + fname

    if os.path.isfile(full_path):
      ret = process_file(full_path)

      if not ret:
        continue

      print "%s: %s" % (ext, full_path)

      with open("scan_res/%s" % ext, "a") as f:
        f.write("%s\n" % full_path)
      continue

    if os.path.isdir(full_path):
      scan_dir(full_path)
      continue


if len(sys.argv) != 2:
  sys.exit("usage: scan_disk.py <start_dir>")

scan_dir(sys.argv[1])
```

And also...

.whl
(Python Wheels)

.npz
(Python NumPy)

.egg
(Python Egg)

zipimport

And also...

(avrdbg/bundles/*.bndl)

Anki

(backup-*.apkg)

gog
com

(*.hashdb)

(*.btapp, *.lng)

Camtasia®

(.cmmbtn, .cmmtpl, .libzip)

An

(*.fla, *.swc)

And also...

Quake 3 (*.pkg)



Uplink (*.dat files)

And also...

Torment (*.ttn savegame files)

Pillars of Eternity (*.savegame)

And also...

.aar (Axis Archive / Android Archive Library)
.appx (Microsoft General MIDI DLS)
.bau (OpenOffice's... something?)
.cache (Microsoft extension*.*.cache?)
.dat (Intel VTune Amplifier resources)
.dpk (YAMAHA... something?)
.dsf (DeDe Symbol Files)
.eftx (Microsoft Office Document Themes Effects)
.fcstd (KiCad 3D shapes)
.hdf, .ise (now really sure, sth hardware related)
.htb (wx wxHTML help format)

And also...

.jisp (Psi icon set)
.little (Thunderbird/Firefox startup cache)
.lsz (LiteStep themes/configuration)
.mshc (Microsoft Help Container File)
.mwb (MySQL Workbench Model)
.nupkg (NuGet packages for .NET)
.ora (OpenRaster, used e.g. by MyPaint)
.otp (OpenOffice templates)
.otx (OpenOffice dictionary)
.pez (Prezi Presentation)
.phar (PHP application package)

And also...

.raz, .saz (Fiddler request history)
.rjt (RealPlayer template?)
.sbsx (PowerPoint shapes)
.snagacc (SnagIt plugin)
.sob (OpenOffice something...)
.sublime-package (Sublime Package, obviously)
.sxw (SUN XML Writer)
.thmx (Microsoft Office document themes)
.vs (RealPlayer UI files?)
.vsb (AIDA64 sidebar gadget)
.wmz (Windows Media Player skins)

And also...

.wsz (LiteStep themes?)
.xmind (xmind documents)
.xmt (xmind template)
.xpi (Firefox Cross-Platform Installer Module)
.xps (XML Paper Specification)
.zxp (PalleteApp extension)

The list is not exhaustive.

Furthermore



It's used when:

- Uploading GERBER files to your PCB manufacturer
  - Or more general: uploading a bundle of files somewhere
  - Or downloading a bundle of files

- Don't forget about combining ZIPs with other file formats, e.g. EXE (SFX)

- And well, sending files to your friends too.




What can a ZIP store?

What can be stored inside a ZIP archive?

Files

Directories

What can be stored inside a ZIP archive?

Files Directories

Technically identical with one minor difference

4.4.15 external file attributes: (4 bytes)

The mapping of the external attributes is host-system dependent (see 'version made by'). For MS-DOS, the low order byte is the **MS-DOS directory attribute byte.** If input came from standard input, this field is set to zero.

What can be stored inside a ZIP archive?

Steganography

Files

Directories



Windows Explorer



7-zip



Total Commander

zipinfo (InfoZIP)

```
compressed size:                14 bytes
uncompressed size:              12 bytes
ilename:                        3 characters
xtra field:                     0 bytes
ile comment:                    0 characters
 on which file begins:          disk 1
le type:                        text
xternal file attributes:        000000 hex
MS-DOS file attributes (10 hex): dir
```

What can be stored inside a ZIP archive?

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What can be stored inside a ZIP archive?

Files Directories

Symlinks

Cyber Secure CloudDisk

File names in ZIP

Stored in several locations per entry:

- Local File Header
- Central Directory Header
- Extra: Info-ZIP Unicode Path Extra Field

Which one to use (trust)?

Technically it's possible to create any number of separate Extra entries per file in both LFH and CDH

File names in ZIP

Unreal Commander exploit for bug reported in 2007



File names in ZIP

Other problems with names (just enumerating ideas):

- Files with the same name

File names in ZIP

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- Network Share names (\\127.0.0.1\C$\...)

https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.de/2016/02/the-definitive-guide-on-win32-to-nt.html

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- Very Long file names (not well known?)

http://www.icewall.pl/?p=467

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- XSS in the <script>filename</script>

Or SQL Injection, in the end the file name is just a text field.

File names in ZIP

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Cyber Secure CloudDisk


ZIP Format 101 & Recovering ZIPs

ZIP Magic: PK

As you know, a ZIP file starts with letters "PK".



	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	01234
00000000	50	4B	03	04	14	00	02	00	08	00	15	4F	AA	42	PK...
0000000E	3C	CF	51	68	46	00	00	00	44	00	00	00	0A	00	<.QhF
0000001C	00	00	72	61	63	69	65	2E	74	65	73	74	8B	30	..rac
0000002A	F5	57	0C	50	75	70	0C	88	36	89	09	88	8A	30	.W.Pu
00000038	35	D1	08	88	D3	34	77	76	D6	34	AF	55	71	F5	5....

ZIP Magic: PK

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

Let's try that again...

file.zip

look for the "header" in the last 65557 bytes of the file

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	0123456789ABCD
00000000	50	4B	03	04	14	00	02	00	08	00	15	4F	AA	42	PK.....O.B
0000000E	3C	CF	51	68	46	00	00	00	44	00	00	00	0A	00	<.QhF...D.....
0000001C	00	00	72	61	63	69	65	2E	74	65	73	74	8B	30	..racie.test.0
0000002A	F5	57	0C	50	75	70	0C	88	36	89	09	88	8A	30	.W.Pup..6....0
00000038	35	D1	08	88	D3	34	77	76	D6	34	AF	55	71	F5	5....4wv.4.Uq.
00000046	74	76	0C	D2	0D	0E	71	F4	73	71	0C	72	D1	75	tv....q.sq.r.u
00000054	F4	0B	F1	0C	F3	0C	0A	0D	D6	0D	71	0D	0E	D1	..........q...
00000062	75	F3	F4	71	55	54	F1	D0	F6	D0	02	00	50	4B	u..qUT......PK
00000070	01	02	14	00	14	00	02	00	08	00	15	4F	AA	42	..........O.B
0000007E	3C	CF	51	68	46	00	00	00	44	00	00	00	0A	00	<.QhF...D.....
0000008C	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	20	00	00	00	00	00	....
0000009A	00	00	72	61	63	69	65	2E	74	65	73	74	50	4B	..racie.testPK
000000A8	05	06	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	38	00	00	00	..........8...
000000B6	6E	00	00	00	00	00									n.....

Proper parsing must start from the end

4.3.16 End of central directory record:

22 bytes

end of central dir signature	4 bytes (0x06054b50)
[...]	
total number of entries in the central directory	2 bytes
size of the central directory	4 bytes
offset of start of central [...]	
.ZIP file comment length	**2 bytes**
.ZIP file comment	**(variable size)**

$0000-$FFFF
0-65535

In total: from 22 to 65557 bytes

(so, the PK\5\6 sig will be "somewhere" between EOF-65557 do EOF-22)

An overview of a single-file ZIP



Each file has two "headers":
Local one, right next to data - **Local File Header**
And the more verbose entry in the list of files - **Central Directory Header**

Please note that it's a "pointer"-based format



More files in a ZIP



Central Directory Header (CDH)

PK\2\1... CDH

central file header signature	4 bytes	(0x02014b50)
version made by	2 bytes	
version needed to extract	2 bytes	
general purpose bit flag	2 bytes	
compression method	2 bytes	
last mod file time	2 bytes	
last mod file date	2 bytes	
crc-32	4 bytes	
compressed size	4 bytes	
uncompressed size	4 bytes	
file name length	2 bytes	
extra field length	2 bytes	
file comment length	2 bytes	
disk number start	2 bytes	
internal file attributes	2 bytes	
external file attributes	4 bytes	
relative offset of local header	4 bytes	

these are redundant between LFH and CDH (xslx)

What if more CDHs point to the same LFH?

file name (variable size)
extra field (variable size)
file comment (variable size)

PK\3\4... LFH + data

Local File Header (LFH)

PK\3\4... LFH + data

local file header signature	4 bytes	(0x04034b50)
version needed to extract	2 bytes	
general purpose bit flag	2 bytes	
compression method	2 bytes	
last mod file time	2 bytes	
last mod file date	2 bytes	
crc-32	4 bytes	
compressed size	4 bytes	
uncompressed size	4 bytes	
file name length	2 bytes	
extra field length	2 bytes	

file name (variable size)
extra field (variable size)
file data (variable size)

How to repair a ZIP?

- Try some programs like Info-ZIP's zip -F and -FF
- Manually - copy correct-looking data between LFH and CDH
- There is also the "CTF brute force approach"

Cyber Secure CloudDisk


Legacy ZIP encryption

Legacy ZipCrypto

7-zip

Also other methods may be available (e.g. RC4)

- Still used by some tools by default
- Really good backward compatibility
- Technically a byte-based stream cipher

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7-zip

Also other methods may be available (e.g. RC4)

- Still used by some tools by default
- Really good backward compatibility
- Technically a byte-based stream cipher
- A "known plaintext" attack known from 1994
  - With further improvements in 2002

Legacy ZipCrypto - papers to read

"A Known Plaintext Attack on the PKZIP Stream Cipher" (1994)
by Eli Biham and Paul C. Kocher

"ZIP Attacks with Reduced Known Plaintext" (2002)
by Michael Stay

Legacy ZipCrypto - a 96-bit byte-oriented stream cipher



Legacy ZipCrypto - updating the key after each byte enc

(from the first paper)

```
key0 = crc32(key0, chr)
```

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key0 = crc32(key0, chr)
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```

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key0 = crc32(key0, chr)
key1 = (key1 + LSB(key0)) * 134775813 + 1
key2 = crc32(key2, MSB(key1)
```

Legacy ZipCrypto - updating the key after each byte enc

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```
key0 = crc32(key0, chr)
key1 = (key1 + LSB(key0)) * 134775813 + 1
key2 = crc32(key2, MSB(key1)
temp = key2 | 3  (16 bottom bits)
key3 = LSB((temp * (temp ^ 1)) >> 8)
```

Legacy ZipCrypto - encryption



(from the first paper)

$$C \leftarrow chr \oplus key3$$

Legacy ZipCrypto - attack (simplified)



(from the first paper)

$$C \leftarrow chr \oplus key3$$

(if we know plaintext, then...)

$$key3 == C \oplus chr$$

Legacy ZipCrypto - attack (simplified)



key0 - key2 livecycle:

1. Init with constants (0x12345678, ...)
2. Update with password (discard output, keep state)
3. Update with 12 bytes of "random data"
4. Update with data to encrypt

Legacy ZipCrypto - attack (simplified)



- The more plaintext we know, the more we can reason about the state of key0 - key2.
- If we unroll to initial state (after password & "random" data is fed), we can decrypt everything.
- Bonus: In some cases we can even get the password.

Legacy ZipCrypto - attack (simplified)



Important notes on the attack:

- Minimum of 13 bytes of known **compressed plaintext**
- **"compressed"** is the keyword here(different apps generate different output when compressing)
- It takes a few minutes to run

Cyber Secure CloudDisk

https://www.unix-ag.uni-kl.de/~conrad/krypto/pkcrack.html


ZIP format and multiple personalities

Proper parsing must start from the end

Let's look at this slide again

4.3.16 End of central directory record:

end of central dir signature	4 bytes	(0x06054b50)
[...]		
total number of entries in the central directory	2 bytes	
size of the central directory	4 bytes	
offset of start of central [...]		
.ZIP file comment length	**2 bytes**	
.ZIP file comment	**(variable size)**	

22 bytes

$0000-$FFFF
0-65535

In total: from 22 to 65557 bytes

(so, the PK\5\6 sig will be "somewhere" between EOF-65557 do EOF-22)

So... how do we search for the right comment size?

"Start First"

Start left most at `EOF-65557`, and then decrease the comment size one by one.

"End First"

(well, usually there are no comments)

Start at the end at `EOF-22`, and then increase comment size one by one.

Why do we care about EOCDH at all?

(who needs this anyway)

"stream"

EOCDH is redundant, let's ignore it and parse
only Local File Headers going from offset 0 in the file
(usually this is faster)
(99.9% of ZIPs can be successfully parsed like this)



Why do we care about EOCDH at all?

(who needs this anyway)

"aggressive stream"

Just ignore the 'garbage' bytes between LFHs.

(forensics / stegano?)



Let's see how this works in practice - abstract.zip

Architecture of abstract.zip



stream

aggressive stream

start-first

end-first

yellow part is technically a comment for the green archive

Testing abstract.zip



Kudos for help in testing this:

- Mulander
- Felix Groebert
- Salvation
- j00ru

Note: data might be a little stale (2013)

EndFirst style



All of these

- Total Commander 8.01
- UnZip 6.00 (Debian)
- Midnight Commander
- Windows 7 Explorer
- ALZip
- KGB Archiver
- 7-zip
- b1.org
- Python zipfile
- JSZip
- C# DotNetZip
- perl Archive::Zip
- Jeffrey's Exif Viewer
- WOBZIP
- GNOME File Roller
- WinRAR
- OSX UnZip
- zip.vim v25
- Emacs Zip-Archive mode
- Ada Zip-Ada v45
- Go archive/zip
- Pharo smalltalk 2.0 ZipArchive
- Ubuntu less
- Java ZipFile

StartFirst style



Only these

PHP ZipArchive
PHP zip_open ...
PHP zip:// wrapper
tcl + tclvfs + tclunzip

Stream style



Only these
Note that Java
is both here and
in the 'EndFirst' list

Ruby rubyzip2
Java ZipArchiveInputStream
java.util.zip.ZipInputStream

Aggressive Stream style



All files should be found

binwalk

Is this a problem?

- Usually no.
- However, if multiple libraries/apps are used, consistency is key.

Think:
1. Content verification done using one approach
2. Actual unpack done using another approach

Is this a problem?

- Usually no.
- However, if multiple libraries/apps are used, consistency is key.

Warning:
There might be other parsing inconsistencies between libraries!
Ideally use a single library.

Think:
1. Content verification done using one approach
2. Actual unpack done using another approach

Also, AV (warning: stale data, 2013)

EICAR test results (using VT):

- Most use End-First approach
- Some use the Aggressive Stream way
- These use the Stream method:
  - VBA32
  - NANO-Antivirus
  - Norman
  - F-Prot
  - Agnitum
  - Commtouch

Cyber Secure CloudDisk


ZIP encryption and CRC32

CRC-32 is a fun one!

Some facts:

- ZIP uses the 0xEDB88320 polynomial
- CRC-32 is not a cryptographic hash
- Reversible to some extent
  - Actually there is quite a lot of fun stuff you can do with CRC

Example reading: "Reversing CRC - Theory and Practice" by M. Stigge, H. Plotz, W. Muller, J-P. Redlich

CRC-32 is a fun one!

Definitely MUST NOT be in the clear!

In some versions, metadata is in the clear

LFH

local file header signature	4 bytes	(0x04034b50)
version needed to extract	2 bytes	
general purpose bit flag	2 bytes	
compression method	2 bytes	
last mod file time	2 bytes	
last mod file date	2 bytes	
crc-32	4 bytes	
compressed size	4 bytes	
uncompressed size	4 bytes	
file name length	2 bytes	
extra field length	2 bytes	

file name (variable size)
extra field (variable size)
file data (variable size)

CRC-32 is a fun one!

Definitely MUST NOT be in the clear!

... but it sometimes is.

See also:

- "ZIP file encryption weakness"
  by K. Matusiewicz, N. Wochtman

- Also on CTFs!
  Task: "A hopeless case" (CONFidence CTF 2015)

Cyber Secure CloudDisk

https://github.com/theonlypwner/crc32


Miscellaneous, i.e. all the things not mentioned so far.

ZIP vs low-level

Just enumerating ideas:

- Known and well loved Buffer Overflow
  - compressed size < after-unpack(data)
  - long file names
- Memory disclosure
  - uncompressed size > after-unpack(data)
  - uncompressed size > compressed size for 'STORED'
- Signed/Unsigned issues in various fields
  - size, offsets

GIFAR / Ange CorkaMIX / etc (binary polyglots)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gifar

https://code.google.com/p/corkami/wiki/mix

CorkaMIX is a Windows executable, and also a working PDF document, Jar (Zip + Class + manifest), and HTML + JavaScript files.

PHP LFI, ZIP polyglot upload, zip:// or phar://

More ZIP steganography

Steganography

Mostly useful on CTFs / in forensics.

- Office XML Steganography Tool (extra field)
- "Empty" space between files
- More data than "uncompressed size" field claims there is. Or data after the DEFLATE "end tag".
- Extra fields, comments.
- Files of the same name, or with \0 in the name
- Well, abstract.zip ;)
- Stegano using the compression protocol/layer

Bonus - ZIP download!

It's a "list + offsets" type format, so...

HTTP Range: parameter can be used to download individual files from a ZIP archive hosted online.

```
> python zipdl.py http://example.com/example.zip
File Name                    ...      Size
readme_EndFirst.txt          ...       231
> python zipdl.py http://example.com/example.zip readme_EndFirst.txt
> ls -la readme_EndFirst.txt
-rw-r----- 1 gynvael gynvael 231 May 13 14:45 readme_EndFirst.txt
>
```

http://gynvael.coldwind.pl/n/python_zipdl

Bonus - ZIP download! Pretty easy in Python...

```
class MyFileWrapper:
  def __init__(self, url):
    --> HEAD ...

  def seek(self, offset, whence):

  def tell(self):

  def read(self, amount=-1):
    --> GET ...
        Range: bytes=%u,%u

z = zipfile.ZipFile( MyFileWrapper_object)
```

Bonus - ZIP DoS aka pack bombs

Three types:

1. **small ZIP --> super large file**
   (unreal cmd uncomp size)

2. **small ZIP --> multiple ZIPs --> multiple ZIPs from each --> ...**
   --> very large files

3. **Infinite recursion (ZIP quine)**
   http://research.swtch.com/zip
   (by Russ Cox)



EPIC!

Bonus - ZIP compression

Usually DEFLATE (zlib), but also:

- Uncompressed (STORED)
- BZ2
- XZ
- WavPack
- (several others)

THE END

Are there any easy questions?

(If there are only hard ones then I'm sorry, but we run out of time ;>)

P.S. We're hiring at Google - reach out to me if you're interested!

E-mail: gynvael@coldwind.pl Twitter: @gynvael YT: GynvaelEN

Blog: http://gynvael.coldwind.pl/ (Soon also: http://gynvael.live)